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CONTEMPT-INJUNCTIONS-Federal Civil Contempt
Decree Orders Deputy Sheriff To Resign From
Office-Lance v. Plummer*
During the summer of 1964, a federal district judge issued an injunction prohibiting various St. Augustine, Florida organizations
and other persons with notice of the injunction from harassing or
intimidating Negroes who were seeking motel or restaurant accommodations.1 Appellant Lance, an unpaid volunteer deputy sheriff,
was not a member of any of the enjoined organizations, but he had
actual notice of the order. Nonetheless, six days after the injunction
was issued, he engaged in activities designed to intimidate a Negro
citizen. 2 In a subsequent civil contempt action arising from these
activities, the federal district judge, asserting jurisdiction over him
because of his actual knowledge of the injunction, found appellant
in contempt. Appellant was not only ordered to pay a small compensatory fee to the complaining party, but, in addition, he was
compelled to resign his position as deputy sheriff and to cease acting
under color of authority as a law enforcement officer.3 On appeal to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, held, affirmed, except that the
prohibition from acting as a deputy was modified so as to continue
only until such time as appellant could satisfy the trial court that
he would thereafter comply with the injunctive order.4 The court
noted that it could assert jurisdiction over a person acting in concert
with a class of enjoined defendants and that it has the power to remove such a person from public office in order to secure compliance
with the injunctive order. The Supreme Court denied appellant's
•- 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965) [hereinafter cited as principal case], cert. denied,
384 U.S. 929 (1966) (Black and Harlan, JJ., dissenting in separate written opinions)
[Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion is hereinafter cited as Black's dissent].
1. Effective immediately, . • . it is further ORDERED that [a named class of
defendants] ••• and any other persons to whom notice or knowledge of this Order
may come, shall not in any way interfere with, molest, threaten, intimidate, or coerce
any persons of the Negro race with the purpose of interfering with such person's
right to seek . • • accommodations.
Principal case at 587-88.
2. While a Negro was being served in a restaurant Lance commented in a loud
voice, "You know I have to protect these black sons of bitches." The next day the
Negro attempted to register in the adjoining motel, and on his departure Lance
threateningly followed him around the city in his automobile. Principal case at 588-89.
3. Within twenty days of this order, he shall submit a verified report to this
Court that lie has resigned his position as deputy sheriff of St. Johns County,
Florida, and surrendered his badge and other incidents of office and of police
equipment to his superiors; and that he shall no longer act under any color, guise,
or pretense of a law enforcement or peace officer.
Principal case at 590.
4. [S]ince sanctions imposed in civil contempt proceedings must always give to
the alleged contemnor the opportunity to bring himself into compliance, the
sanction cannot be one that does not come to an end when he repents his past
conduct and purges himself.
Principal case at 592.
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petition for a writ of certiorari, Justices Black and Harlan dissenting
in written opinions.
Appellant's initial objection to the contempt decree was that the
district court lacked jurisdiction over him because he had not been a
party to the injunction proceedings. At first glance this contention
seems quite valid, for there is authority to the effect that an injunction can bind only those who are parties to the action in which the
injunction is issued.5 Indeed, Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that an injunction is binding only "upon
the parties to the action." However, Rule 65(d) also provides that
an injunction is binding on "those persons in active concert or participation with [the parties] ... who receive actual notice of the
order by personal service or otherwise." 6 In the principal case, the
district court attempted to sustain jurisdiction simply on the basis of
appellant's knowledge of the injunctive order,7 but the court of "
appeals found ample evidence within the findings of the district
court to establish that appellant was acting in concert with the enjoined parties.8 Thus, the Fifth Circuit Court was legitimately able
to sustain the exercise of jurisdiction over appellant even though he
was not a party to the injunction proceeding.9
Of far greater importance than the jurisdictional question, however, is the court's decree ordering appellant to resign from public
office. Such a decree appears to be unprecedented and is a significant
expansion of the contempt power of the federal courts. As Mr.
Justice Black pointed out in his dissenting opinion to the Court's
5. Swetland v. Curry, 188 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1951); accord, Kean v. Hurley, 179
F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1950); Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930); see
3 BARRON 8: HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1437 (1958). It follows that
the provision of the injunctive order in the principal case which attempted to bind
all persons with knowledge of that order had no legal force. Chase Nat'l. Bank v.
Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 437 (1934); accord, NLRB v. Birdsall-Stockdale Motor Co., 208
F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1953); Chisolm v. Caines, 147 F. Supp. 188 (E.D.S.C., 1954); cf.
Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945).
There is some earlier authority to the effect that any person knowing of an
injunction and in violation of it can be found guilty of contempt, even if he is not
named in the injunctive order. These cases have probably been overruled by implication, Swetland v. Curry, supra at 843; Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, supra at 833, but,
assuming arguendo that they are still good law, they apparently allow only criminal,
and not civil, contempt actions, Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 112 (1922);
accord, In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 554 (1897); Chisolm v. Caines, 121 Fed. 397 (C.C.D.
S.C. 1903); In re Reese, 107 Fed. 942 (8th Cir. 1901). See generally Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunction, Civil and Criminal, 43 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 780, 813-14 (1943).
6. Fro. R. CIV. P. 65(d).
7. Principal case at 590.
8. On each occasion, when the Negro appeared to assert his rights, appellant also
appeared, and the trial court found, that he was acting in response to signals from the
motel manager. Principal case at 588.
9. Principal case at 591. Mr. Justice Black seems to have overlooked this shift of
jurisdictional basis, for he states: "There was no finding below that Lance was in any
way an agent or was acting in concert with any of the defendants who were ordered
not to intimidate or coerce Negroes." Black's dissent at 930 n.l.
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refusal to grant a writ of certiorari, such an expansion, with its
potentially dangerous impact on the rights of individual public
officials and on the federal system of checks and balances, should not
be permitted to stand unless the Supreme Court first reviews the
expansion and defines its scope. 10
First of all, as Mr. Justice Black noted, the decision in the
principal case raises serious constitutional questions, for it extends
the equity powers of the federal courts into an area in which the
federal courts generally have not interfered. Federal courts sitting
in equity have traditionally declined to remove state officials,11 and
even, in certain situations, federal administrative officials,12 regardless of the seriousness of their misconduct. This is because removal
of officials has been considered a matter within the realm of political
action, a realm into which the federal courts should not enter out
" of respect for the other branches of govemment. 13 In dealing with
• the reapportionment problem, the Supreme Court, in order to insure that constitutional requirements of representative government
are not abused, seems to have modified this phase of the political
question doctrine so as to allow judicial inquiry into the legislative
branch of govemment. 14 However, in Baker v. Carr, the Court explicitly declined to overrule the doctrine that a federal court in
equity should not interfere with the appointment or removal process
itself. 15 Since the court in the principal case forced appellant to
resign his position, its decree would appear to be inconsistent with
this line of authority.
Moreover, federal courts have been reluctant to interfere with
10. This examination of the principal case will not attempt to deal with the problem of classifying this as a civil, rather than criminal, contempt action. Notice, however, that since one of the principal factors used by a lower court in classifying a
given action is the nature of the relief asked, Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590
(1947), the plaintiff himself makes the initial determination whether the action will
be treated as civil or criminal contempt. In the principal case, the action was brought
as one for civil contempt probably because of a provision in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, tit. XI, § 1101, 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(h) (1964), requiring jury trial in
criminal contempt actions arising under the Act and preserving summary non-jury
proceedings in civil contempt actions.
Moreover, a trial court's classification of a given action appears to be conclusive,
and not subject to adequate review, due to the line of authority holding that "it is the
purpose of the punishment, rather than the character of the act punished, which
determines whether the proceeding is for civil or criminal contempt." Lamb v. Cramer,
285 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1932); accord, Go:npers v. Bucks Stove &: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418
(1911). This practice is criticized in Moskovitz, supra note 5. For a more comprehensive treatment of the whole problem of classification, see generally GOLDFARB, THE
CONTEMPT POWER 49-67 (1963); Comment, The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt,
33 U. CHI. L. REv. 120 (1965).
11. Walton v. House of Representatives of Oklahoma, 265 U.S. 487 (1924): accord,
Taylor v. Beckham (No. 1), 178 U.S. 548 (1900); In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888): see
cases cited Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 558 (1954).
12. White v. Berry, 171 U.S. 366 (1898).
13. See cases cited note 11 supra.
14. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
15. Id. at 231.
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state governmental operations because of our federalist structure of
government. 16 To be sure, the fourteenth amendment prohibits
state action which abridges the privileges and immunities of American citizenship, and this has been construed to mean that the federal
courts have jurisdiction over states' agents and officials,17 the doctrine of sovereign immunity of the states notwithstanding. 18 Under
this constitutional provision, Congress has authorized the bringing
of civil suits against state government officials who deprive citizens
of their privileges and immunities,19 as well as the imposition
of criminal fines and federal imprisonment for violations of the
fourteenth amendment prohibitions.20 Even in the absence of specific
legislative authorization, the courts, in order to preserve fourteenth
amendment rights, have employed their powers at law or in equity:
enjoining state officials from taking certain actions; 21 overturning
state action already taken; 22 and enjoining court proceedings in some
instances.23 But Congress has never authorized the removal of state
officials from their offices, and the courts have never before done so
on their own initiative. It might be argued that the difference between imprisoning a police officer and compelling him to resign is
insignificant, for in either situation, by rendering the officer totally
unavailable to act for the state, the courts interfere with state exercise of its police power. Yet the difference in form is not so insignificant as it may seem. Congress has prescribed the sanction of imprisonment for certain illegal actions, whereas it has not authorized
this additional sanction of removal from office. Furthermore, in the
interest of maintaining our system of federalism, the federal government has sought to limit its interference in state affairs as much as
possible; 24 actually removing a state official from his position may
certainly be deemed interference, and in the principal case, it was
16. Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379, 392 (1931); accord, Metcalf
8e Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
lH6 (1819).
17. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 100 (1951); accord, Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339 (1880).
18. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); accord, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908).
19. REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
21. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); accord, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908). But see Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944). See
generally Isseks, Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts To Enjoin Unauthorized
Action of State Officials, 40 HARV. L. REv. 969 (1927).
22. E.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
23. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). But see Douglas v. City
of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). See generally Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal
Courts To Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169 (1933).
24. "[E]ach government, in order that it may administer its affairs within its own
sphere, must be left free from undue interference by the other." Metcalf &: Eddy
v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926); accord, Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S.
379, 392 (1931); cf. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
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not demonstrated that such interference was necessary. 25 Finally,
the extent of this new remedy pattern is undefined, something which
is not true with respect to the older remedies, since a considerable
body of law has been developed to prevent their abusive use. 26
In addition to its potentially adverse impact on federal-state relations, the decision in the principal case presents difficulties insofar
as the court has gone beyond the traditional sanctions imposed for
civil contempt without a showing that these sanctions were inadequate, with the result that the court has seriously impinged upon
the rights of the individual involved. One of the principal functions
of a civil contempt decree is to compel compliance with a prior
court order. 27 The courts will normally insure such compliance by
one of the following: im,prisoning the contemner until he has
demonstrated a willingness to comply; 28 ordering the contemner to
publish notice to the injured party, the general public, or both that
he has been found guilty of contempt of court but that he will
comply with the court order in the future; 29 or by threatening the
contemner with heavy economic sanctions if he should again fail to
comply.30 It may be significant that the court in the principal case
did not indicate why any one of these sanctions could not have been
effectively used in this situation.
To be sure, there is authority which indicates that in contempt
actions a court may use whatever power is necessary,31 but while
25. And no one claims that this new federal judge power to remove state officers
is necessary to enforce the salutary provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
It is clear that the judge's order here provides complete protection to the plaintiff's rights withou~ that part compelling the State's deputy sheriff to hold his
job at the pleasure of the United States judges.
Black's dissent at 932.
26. See generally KAUPER, PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS: FLUID CONCEPTS IN
CIVIL LmERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1962); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60
COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1960).
27. Bessette v. W. B. Conkley Co., 194 U.S. 324, 328 (1904); see 17 AM. JuR. 2D
Contempt § 105 (1964) and cases cited therein. The other primary function is to
provide a remedy specifically for a party who may or has suffered damages as a consequence of the contempt. Thus, in the principal case, appellant was also required
to pay a small compensatory fee to the complaining party. Principal case at 590.
28. Release is contingent upon compliance with the previously violated order, and
thus it is often said that contemners "carry the keys of their prison in their own
pockets." In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). For a criticism of this indefinite
imprisonment, see generally Politano v. Politano, 146 Misc. 792, 262 N.Y. Supp. 802
(Sup. Ct. 1933); Goldfarb, The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 MICH, L. !\EV·
283 (1962); Comment, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 120 (1965).
29. NLRB v. Vander Wal, 316 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1963); West Texas Util. Co. v.
NLRB, 206 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855 (1953).
30. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) ($2,800,000 conditional fine):
Meredith v. Fair, 313 F.2d 532 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. ·915 (1962) (conditional
fine of $10,000 per day levied on Gov. Ross Barnett of Mississippi).
31. "The measure of the court's power in civil contempt proceedings is determined
by the requirements of full remedial relief. They may entail the doing of various
acts •.••" McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 193 (1949); accord, NLRB
v. Vander Wal, 316 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1963).
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these cases seem to lend some legitimacy to the court's action, they
are distinguishable since they involve the power of a court to compensate fully the victim of the contemptuous act, rather than the
power to coerce compliance with an injunctive order, as in the
principal case.82 The argument that contempt power should be
treated as sui generis is of no greater support; 33 this is merely a way
to avoid having to face the difficult question of how much contempt
power a judge ought to have and how he ought to use it. If the office
appellant was forced to resign was the principal source of his livelihood rather than merely a volunteer part-time position, the decree
would seem rather harsh indeed, and yet the court has made no
effort to restrict its future use of the power to force resignations.
Moreover, there may be some question whether the sanction imposed by the court in the principal case is as effective as are the traditional sanctions. While the court's action will prevent appellant
from intimidating Negroes by "riding his badge" again, it would
seem that a jail sentence or heavy economic sanction is more apt to
prevent or discourage appellant from further contemptuous acts.
Finally, one must consider that in indirect contempt actionsactions arising from conduct outside the presence of the court-a
judge must necessarily rely on the testimony of the litigants or other
witnesses.84 Yet all civil contempt actions, including indirect contempts, are normally heard in summary proceedings in which pleading rules, procedural formalities, and even rules of evidence are
suspended.35 In such proceedings, the rights of an accused contemner
are dangerously curtailed; hence any expansion of the power available to a judge in these proceedings, such as is represented by the
decree rendered in the principal case, would appear to be unwise. 36
Similarly, the right to jury trial occupies an important place in our
constitutional heritage, and as long as this right is denied to contemners,37 the power which a judge may wield ought to be carefully
32. In McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., supra note 31, appellee violated an
injunctive order regarding minimum wage restrictions, and was ordered to give
employees back pay in accordance with a prescribed formula. In NLRB v. Vander Wal,
supra note 31, the ccurt ordered appellee to pay legal fees, court costs, and all other
expenses caused by his refusal to arbitrate grievances.
33. Black.mer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440 (1932); accord, Bessette v. W. B.
Conkley Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326 (1904).
34. See GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER ch. 1 (1963). This is in contrast to direct
contempt actions which arise out of acts committed within the presence of the court.
35. See Sacher v. United State:;, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952). A summary proceeding was
used at the trial of appellant in the principal case. Black's dissent at 931.
36. See SWAYZEE, CONTEMPT OF COURT IN LABOR INJUNCTION CAsEs (1935); Goldfarb,
The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 MICH, L. REv. 283 (1962); cf. Sacher v.
United States, 343 U.S. 1, 14 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
37. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964). Although the case is distinguishable by virtue of being a criminal, rather than civil, contempt action, the denial of
the right to a jury trial probably applies equally to civil contempt cases, since the
argument in favor of that right ought to be stronger in the criminal contempt context.
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circumscribed rather than expanded.38 Not surprisingly, in an earlier
decision, Mr. Justice Black discerned "a congressional plan to limit
the contempt power to 'the least possible power adequate to the end
proposed,' " 39 and another federal judge has urged that "the grant of
summary contempt power ... is to be grudgingly construed [and]
... restricted to the bedrock cases ...." 40 The principal case runs
directly counter to these policies.41
Despite the objections discussed above, one may argue that there
were some utilitarian reasons for having fashioned this strong sanction. The situation in St. Augustine was explosive, with tempers
high and racial sensitivity keen. Faced with a contemptuous act, the
court may have found its action necessary in order to show unequivocally to the contemner and others who shared his views that
it would not sit by idly and let its orders be violated. However, it
does appear in retrospect that such an unprecedented sanction would
not have been necessary. A judge would only have needed to demonstrate that he would act rapidly and directly to curb contemptuous
acts, and this could have been accomplished without exceeding the
scope of the traditional contempt remedies.
Thus, the court could have and should have restricted itself to
the use of one of the traditional sanctions, and in the event that they
proved to be insufficient to coerce general compliance, then a criminal contempt action should have been the next step, complete with
jury trial as guaranteed in the 1964 Civil Rights Act.42 Congress apparently intended that criminal contempt actions be used in extreme
cases, or its inclusion of this provision in the Act was mere sur38. Mr. Justice Goldberg dissented from the Barnett opinion, arguing that since
the decrees rendered in contempt actions are more severe now than they were at the
time the Constitution was written, the right to a jury trial ought to be extended to
contemners. United States v. Barnett, supra note 37, at 728. See also Green v. United
States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); Goldfarb, The Constitution and
Contempt of Court, 61 MICH. L. R.Ev. 283 (1962).
39. Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 404 (1956), citing Anderson v. Dunn,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821); accord, Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657, 667
(5th Cir. 1965); cf. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 167 (1963).
40. Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1954).
41. Although summary contempt proceedings have long been employed in direct
contempt actions, their application to indirect contempt actions dates from a 1765
case in which Judge Wilmot utilized them, for political reasons, by distorting prior
authority to rationalize his actions. Blackstone accepted Judge Wilmot's interpretation
of the cases and incorporated it into his Commentaries. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
•282-83. This is apparently the origin of the American application of summary pro•
ceedings to indirect contempts. See generally GOLDFARB, THE CONTE!\l:PT POWER ch. 1
(1963); Fox, The King v. Almon. (pts. 1 &: 2), 24 L.Q. R.Ev. 184, 266 (1908); Fox, The
Summary Process to Punish Contempt. (pts. 1 &: 2), 25 L.Q. R.Ev. 238, 354 (1909).
Mr. Justice Black rested on his belief that Blackstone was in error as one basis for arguing
that the law of contempt should be changed, Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165,
193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting), but without success, for the American practice has
become firmly established.
42. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. XI, § 1101, 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(h)
(1964).
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plusage. It is unfortunate that the federal courts chose instead to
expand the power and discretion available to a judge in a summary
civil contempt proceeding, and to do so in a manner which is
subject to criticism on so many different grounds. It is equally unfortunate that the Supreme Court permitted such a decree to stand
without review.43

43. "I regret that the Court refuses to review this case in order to make it clear
to all the people just how far this new contempt power of federal judges goes."
Black's dissent at 982.

